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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
such statutes can be and have been quickly and easily amended.'
It would probably suffice to provide that the income should be
taxed to the settlor if he could revest title in himself within a
period deprivation of the income of which would be a substantial
economic loss to the settlor. Three years may be suggested as an
appropriate length for the period.
-FREDERICK H. BARNETT.
TRUSTS - POWER OF COURT TO REQUIRE TRUSTEE IN DEED OF
TRUST TO INSURE. - Pending a chancery suit charging usury in
loans secured by a deed of trust for the benefit of creditors, the
chancellor upon the suggestion of the trustee ordered him to pro-
cure insurance on buildings covered by the trust deed, which con-
tained no provision for insurance. The order constituted insur-
ance premiums part of the cost of the suit. The trustee insured
for one year but the buildings were destroyed by fire one day
after the expiration of the policy, and before the usury proceed-
ing was finally settled. The grantor of the deed of trust, pur-
porting to act for himself and the beneficiaries thereunder, sought
to hold the trustee liable for the failure to renew the policy. A
decree overruling a demurrer to the bill was reversed on appeal.
The court held, in effect, that the decree requiring insurance was
void for the want of jurisdiction. KHle v. Forman.'
From the facts as stated in the opinion, it seems that the
court could have disposed of the case on the ground that the
grantor was not a proper party to bring suit. For if the grantor
had parted with his title, conveying to the trustee absolutely, the
trustee's obligations were only to the beneficiaries; and on the
other hand, if the conveyance were a deed of trust in the nature
of a mortgage, the grantor remaining in possession and control,
as apparently he did, the trustee owed him no fiduciary responsi-
bilities, except those expressly designated in the trust instrument.2
But as between a beneficiary and a trustee, the latter owes
'Thus on March 2, 1931, the Supreme Court -decided that the estate of a
settlor had been improperly taxed. A bill to amend the statute was intro-
duced into the House of Representatives the next day, was passed unanimous-
ly by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President on the same
day. See note (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 438.
1167 S. E. 744 (W. Va. 1933).
2In the absence of agreement or covenant no relation of trust or con-
fidence exists between the beneficiary and trustee on one side and the grantor
of a deed of trust on the other. Summers v. County of Kanawba, 26 W. Va.
159, 171 (1885).
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the former fiduciary duties, which may vary somewhat with the
nature of the trust. In an active trust situation where the trustee
has control and management of the property, the courts are gen-
erally in accord on the proposition that the trustee must make
necessary repairs,3 pay taxes' and secure insurance.'
Under the deed of trust relationship of the principal case
there probably was no duty at the inception upon the trustee to
procure insurance.' But admitting this to be the rule, was the
chancellor without jurisdiction to require insurance under the
facts of the case? The trustee sought the aid of the court pend-
ing the usury proceeding which continued for over two years.
A court of equity has broad power to protect and preserve the
trust from destruction.! The chancellor has on occasion over-
ridden the express language of the settlor in the matter of invest-
ments.8 This power to protect the res would seem to be extensive
enough to include the requiring of insurance. Whether it be ap-
propriate in a given case so to require is a matter of propriety
and not of fundamental jurisdiction and thus would not be sub-
ject to collateral attack. That the trustee may be subjected tem-
porarily to the financial burden of the insurance is not control-
ling in the light of the accepted theory of trustee liability to third
parties in trust administration.
-CHAnrS W. CALDWELL.
ODisbrow v. )isbrow, 167 N. Y. 606, 60 N. E. 1110 (1901); 2 PERRY,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. Baldes 1929) § 526.
4 Moyris v. Joseph, 1 W. Va. 256 (1866); PERRY, op. cit. supra n. 3, § 527.
rBridge v. Bridge, 146 Mass. 373, 15 N. E. 899 (1888); PERRY, Op. Oit.
supra n. 3, § 527.
To the effect that the money paid for insurance should come from the
income of the life tenant, see Stevens v. Mulcher, 152 N. Y. 551, 46 N. E.
965 (1897).
It has been tsated as an elementary principal of law that the trustee's
duties, powers and liabilities are defined and limited by the instrument
creating the trust, and he can do with the trust property only what the
instrument expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do. Carter v. Carter,
87 W. Va. 254, 104 S. E. 558 (1920); George v. Zinn, 57 W. Va. 16, 49 S.
E. 904 (1904); Miller v. Mitchell, 58 W. Va. 431, 52 S. E. 478 (1905);
Diehl v. Cotts, 48 W. Va. 255, 37 S. E. 546 (1900); and Atkinson v. Beckett,
34 W. Va. 584, 12 S. E. 717 (1890).
7Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N. B. 691 (1903).
8In the investment of trust funds the chancellor, under the "doctrine of
necessity", has the power to break in upon the trust and thwart the express
intention of the settlor. Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 65 N.
J. Eq. 11, 55 Atl. 468 (1900).
Where the income is not sufficient to make repairs and pay taxes, the
court can order a sale. Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N. B. 523 (1898).
But see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 146 Va. 197, 135 S. B. 882
(1926), where the court said that a court of equity does not have the power
to decree a sale on credit when the deed of trust requires cash, even though
there would be a benefit to the beneficiaries and grantor.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1933], Art. 14
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss4/14
